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Ideological Force of Accountability
Accountability
policies not only regulate educational practice but also are a form of
symbolic politics (Gusfield, 1986). They shape the public definition of
education, explain educational failure, and organize consciousness
around shared understandings of what constitutes legitimate classroom
knowledge, educational practice, and valorized social identities. At
Brewer, as high-stakes testing has elevated the knowledge and skills
emphasized by the ITBS and the ISAT, it has also devalued curricula and
pedagogies rooted in the language, culture, lived experiences, and
identities of Mexican and Mexican-American students (Lipman &
Gutstein, 2001). New requirements for testing bilingual students in
English and the district’s new bilingual education standards also
symbolically privilege English language acquisition over bilingualism
and biculturalism, devaluing Spanish, the first language of virtually
all of the students or their families in the school. Furthermore,
Brewer teachers maintained that practice for multiple-choice,
one-right-answer, timed tests undermined their efforts to foster a
classroom culture that would encourage students to think for
themselves, to question their texts, the teacher, and the authority of
official knowledge. (See Lipman & Gutstein, 2001.)
High-stakes policies also relocate responsibility for
the failure of public education from the state to individuals (cf.
Katz, 2001). In extended interviews, Brewer eighth-graders interpreted
test failure and retention as their own fault (Lipman & Gutstein,
2001). In fact, the high-stakes nature of accountability and sanctions
against individuals and schools feeds a pervasive CPS culture of
individual blame. When students fail, they blame themselves or complain
about their teachers; teachers denounce students and parents; central
administrators accuse school administrators, teachers, students, and
parents. This mentality is instantiated in the CPS parent report card,
on which primary teachers grade parents’ support for their children’s
education.
CPS policies also frame schooling in a language that
business under-stands — regulation, accountability, and quality
assurance (see Mickelson, Ray, & Smith, 1994). Discursively, the
policies define education as a commodity whose production can be
quantified, regulated, and designed much like any other product.
Symbolically as well as practically, a tough retention policy,
high-stakes standardized tests, and discipline and control of both
students and schools certify for Chicago business that CPS graduates
will have the specific literacies and dispositions it demands. The
retention policy, for example, stamps a seal of approval on students
who pass to the next grade, confirming that those who progress meet
“industry” standards. Consistent improvement, signified by test scores,
is also central to Chicago’s image as a city remaking itself. Mayor
Daley claims that recent “improvements” in schools demonstrate that
Chicago is the “city that works” and are helping to make Chicago “a
world class city.” In a 1998 report, the Commercial Club praised the
Mayor’s school reforms and identified education to prepare a skilled
work force as one of three top priorities to realize its vision of a
multicentered region of “knowledge, expertise, and economic
opportunity” (Johnson, 1998, p. 3). This partly explains why the stakes
are so high for improving test scores and why their release each spring
has become a public spectacle.
At the same time, educational disparities produced by
retention and test-driven teaching are likely to deepen race and class
inequalities in a world increasingly dominated by those who have access
to the production and processing of knowledge. Equally important, the
weight of these policies may supplant educational experiences that can
help students think critically about the inequalities being produced in
their own neighborhoods and in the city as a whole.
Remediation and Standards
CPS
leaders contend that schools are providing a comprehensive system of
“special help” for failing students (CPS Promotes Retained Students,
1999), including after-school remediation programs, mandatory summer
school, and transition (remedial) high schools. My data challenge CPS’s
contention that these supports are getting failing students “back on
track” and “prepared for the academic work of the next grade” (“CPS
Promotes … ,” 1999). All of the remedial programs concentrate on the
ITBS. CPS is explicit about this. The after-school program uses a
board-created curriculum that “focuses on boosting standardized test
scores for third-, sixth-, and eighth-graders not meeting promotion
standards” (Public Schools Receive $2.25 Million,1998). Summer school
and transition centers are also geared to passing the tests, the
capstone experience for both.
Counter to the board’s claim of “state of the art”
curricula, a review of the written curriculum in remedial programs
suggests that it is test-oriented, narrow, and inconsistent. For
example, the mandated, semiscripted 1999 Summer Bridge curriculum for
eighth-grade math is a series of rather disconnected lessons generally
aligned with the content of the ITBS and an incoherent pedagogy with
practice for passing the tests as well as unrelated open-ended work.
The teachers’ manual for eighth-grade math had about one error per
lesson (Gutstein, 1999). Many summer school teachers are not experts in
the content area that they are assigned to teach; in fact, some are
learning along with the students (using an inaccurate teacher’s
manual). The 1999 eighth-grade Summer Bridge reading program at Brewer
had no classroom sets of literature texts, no class discussion of
literature, and no writing assignments (Gutstein, 2001). Moreover,
students who fail the ITBS in one area (reading or math) are required
to attend summer school in both sub-jects; so many students are sitting
through lessons in material they already understand.
Although transition high schools offer the benefits
of small size and counseling, the course of study is narrow (math,
English, and world studies — no science, art, music, or foreign
language) and revolves around intensive ITBS preparation (see Duffrin,
1999a, 1999b). Former Brewer students reported that their transition
center curriculum entailed no discussion of literature but rather a
constant diet of worksheets geared primarily to standardized tests. The
“library” had no books, and gym classes were held in an empty room with
no equipment (Gutstein, 2001). A teacher at another transition center
described a low-level curriculum: “We try to boil the concepts down to
the point where if they just pay attention, they will succeed”
(Duffrin, 1999a, p. 6). The impoverishment and redundancy of this basic
skills education for students whom the school district has defined as
“behind” can hardly be construed as an antidote for the inequities of
the system, particularly as African-Americans and Latinos are
disproportionately assigned to transition centers. Mandating a
rudimentary curriculum that few middle-class parents would choose for
their own children also symbolically constructs low-income children of
color as deficient, a stigma that all of the students interviewed by
Gutstein (2001) were bitterly aware of.
Defenders of CPS policies argue that the Chicago
Academic Standards (CAS) and Curriculum Frameworks Statements (CFS)
ensure that all students are taught the same challenging academic
content (Board of Education, 1997). However, although most teachers I
interviewed supported the concept of a common curriculum framework for
each grade, my school data indicate that, in the day-to-day work of
teachers, the meaning of the standards varies widely. Many teachers at
Brewer, Grover, and Westlawn simply give lip service tothe CAS,
plugging them into lesson plans after they write them. A few teachers
at these schools, and most teachers at Farley, offered detailed
critiques of specific standards and their grade-level appropriateness
and adopted them selectively. (See Lipman, forthcoming.) Across the
board, the standards were imposed with little discussion or
professional development and with little attention to the complexity
and judgment intrinsic in teaching (see Sheldon& Riddle, 1998).
Setting rigorous standards does not address how they
can be met in the context of Chicago’s entrenched inequalities in
resources, opportunities to learn, and teachers’ knowledge. Without
addressing these inequalities, standards are likely to intensify
inequality (Apple, 1996). Teachers I interviewed contended that the CAS
superficially elevate academic expectations without the curricular
scaffolding or intensive support necessary for students who lack prior
knowledge and skills. Without support for students and teachers and
without reconceptualizing curricula, pedagogy, and assessment, failure
to meet the standards can deepen school failure and students’ sense of
inadequacy and justify remedial experiences such as summer school and
transition high schools. In fact, the emphasis on standards as a path
to equity is part of a shift away from the responsibility of the state
to provide additional resources to make up for past discrimination.
Like high stakes testing, the standards help legitimate a system that,
as a whole, continues to produce inequality. As others have argued
(e.g., Apple, 1988,1996; Bohn & Sleeter, 2000; Tate, 1997),
standards also elevate the knowledge and cultural capital of privileged
groups and devalue the cultural capital of low-income students,
particularly students of color. Teachers at Brewer reported that the
standards for bilingual education validate behaviors characterized as
“American” and devalue those of non–English speakers (Lipman&
Gutstein, 2001).
Patterns of Inequality in New Programs and Schools
Since 1995, CPS has initiated a variety of special programs, schools,
and instructional approaches with significant implications in Chicago’s
current economic context. For purposes of analysis, I have divided
programs and schools into “plus” and “minus.” (My analysis is based
primarily on data from the 1999–2000 school year.) Under the plus
category I include those that purport to offer a college preparatory
course of study and intellectually challenging curricula. Plus programs
that pre-date the 1995 reforms are elementary magnet schools, regional
gifted centers, and classical schools; Grade 7–12 Academic Centers for
“academically advanced students”; and traditional magnet high schools.
New (post-1995) plus programs and schools are expanded International
Baccalaureate (IB) programs, College Prep Regional Magnet High Schools,
and Math, Science, Technology Academies (MSTAs). Under the minus
category I include programs and schools that focus on vocational
education, restricted (basic skills) curricula, and intensified
regimentation of instruction and control of students. Pre-1995 minus
schools are vocational high schools and elementary schools using
scripted direct instruction (DI).20 Not to be confused with direct
teaching of specific skills and concepts, DI employs teacher-read
scripts and mastery of a fixed sequence of skills. Its philosophical
underpinning is behaviorism and a deficit model of “economically
disadvantaged” students (Becker, 1977). Post-1995 minus programs or
schools include DI schools and Education-to-Career Academies (ETCs).
Many of the vocational focuses of ETCs involve a core of nonacademic
work, such as courses of study for cosmetology, secretarial science,
and hospitality management. I also include the highly regimented
military high schools, although CPS labels them college prep. I have
not categorized some programs because, in my observations, they vary
widely and may exist in name only (e.g., a “Science Academy” with no
special science program); and some, such as magnet clusters, were
designated with little or no knowledge on the part of the principals of
the schools involved and no programmatic development.21 A few schools
have plus and minus programs.22
The school district is divided like a layer cake,
from north to south, into six administrative regions (see Figures 1 and
2). The area along Lake Michigan, from the middle of Region 1 to the
northern border of Region 5, forms a band of high-income or
increasingly gentrified neighborhoods. These wealthy and gentrifying
areas along the lake are spreading west into working class
neighborhoods and abandoned industrial corridors.23 Region 1 has the
largest concentration of middle- to upper-income families, (24) and
gentrification is progressing through the region’s mix of immigrant,
working-class, and low-income neighborhoods. Region 2 includes the
elite Gold Coast along the lake shore and expanding middle- and
upper-income areas to the west. Regions 3–6 include the largest
concentrations of very low-income African-Americans and Latinos in the
city. However, the west and south fringes of the Loop (center city),
located on the lake in Region 3, are exploding with upper-income
residential developments, and there is gentrification along the lake in
Region 4. There are large concentrations of very low-income Latinos,
African Americans, and Whites in Region 6 as well, but this region also
has middle-income concentrations. In sum, wealthy and gentrified or
gentrifying areas are located primarily along the lake in Regions 1–4
and are expanding westward. Low-income areas are concentrated in large
West Side and South Side tracts of the city, primarily in Regions 3–6.
Figure 1 shows that pre-1995 plus and minus programs
and schools were distributed across the city and within each region.
The wide distribution of plus programs primarily reflects magnet
elementary schools and gifted centers, many of which came out of the
Board’s early-1980s desegregation plan. Figure 1 also shows several
patterns: (a) a concentration of plus programs and schools in a
relatively small, upper-income White area along the north lake shore in
Regions 1 and 2; (b) a cluster of minus programs and schools in low-
and very low-income African-American and Latino areas of Regions 2, 3,
and 4; (c) no plus programs or schools in the very large low-and very
low-income African-American areas of Region 5. (Region 5 has no
Regional Gifted Center, Academic Center, or Classical School.)
The data reveal an interesting pattern when we look
at the geographic distribution of new plus and minus programs created
under the 1995 reforms (Figure 2) and examine which are operational and
involve all students in the school and which are not operational or
involve only a small percentage of the students in the school. First,
the only new plus whole schools are Regional College Prep Magnet High
Schools. Four (Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4) are located in, or draw from,
upper-income or gentrifying neighborhoods, and three are in prime lake
shore areas.25 The Region 6 magnet is in a middle-to low-income
African-American community. The Region 5 magnet, in the heart of a very
low- to low-income African-American community, is the only one of the
six schools that is not in a new or rehabilitated building. There is no
regional magnet college prep high school in the extensive low-income
African-American and Latino West Side. It is notable that two of the
new schools, Northside Prep (Region 1) and Payton (Region 2) are in
lavish new buildings. Northside cost $47 million; Payton, $33 million
(Martinez, 1999).
Figure 1. Map of pre-1995 special programs and schools.
Both are in neighborhoods with median home prices eight to ten times
those of the neighborhoods of the Region 5 and 6 magnets (Williams,
2000). In fall 2001, Jones (Region 3 magnet) began a $50 million
renovation. In addition to unequal facilities, principals of college
preparatory magnets have also reported dramatic north-south disparities
in resources and time to design curriculum and recruit teachers. (See
Catalyst, 2000.) Significantly, pressure from South Side
African-American leaders reportedly pushed the board to increase the
Region 6 magnet’s original renovation budget from $1.5 million to $33
million (Williams, 2000).
Second, IB programs, although distributed equitably,
two per region, were funded in 2000 for just 30 students at each high
school grade. IB students will comprise 4 to 9 percent of each school’s
student body except in two schools where 12.6 percent and 15.4 percent,
respectively, are in the IB pro
Figure 2. Map of post-1995 special programs and schools.
gram. In total, in 2000, the IBs involved 1.89 percent of all CPS high
school students, and most IBs are not fully operational.
Third, there is a proliferation of minus programs and
schools in Regions 3, 4, 5, and 6 in low- and very low-income
African-American and Latino areas. These mainly reflect the creation of
ETCs and the expansion of DI schools from 7 prior to 1995 to 45 in 2001
(personal communication, CPS Office of Accountability, October 2001).
Many of the new minus programs and schools are operational and involve
all students in a given school (all ETCs, military high schools, and
some DI schools).26 (On Figure 2, I mark DI schools as programs because
schoolwide implementation varies.) Both Chicago and Carver Military
High School are in the heart of African-American low-income
neighborhoods in the South Side.
In short, when we examine the distribution of new
programs against CPS’s claim of expanding educational opportunity, we
find that although high-profile programs and schools alleged to be
academically challenging are scattered throughout the city, almost all
whole-school college-preparatory-programs initiated in the last four
years are clustered in middle-class, White, or gentrifying areas. Most
academically challenging programs in low-income communities involve
only a portion of the students. Vocational, military, and DI schools —
most involving all students in a school — are clustered in low-income
African-American or Latino areas.
I calculated that, in the 1999–2000 academic year,
only 8.31 percent of all 95,235 enrolled high school students were in
special college preparatory high school programs — including magnet
high schools (5.86%), high school IB programs (1.89%), and MSTAs
(0.56%) (CPS Web site; Allensworth & Rosenkranz,2000). This
percentage includes three college preparatory magnet high schools, one
IB program existing prior to 1995, and one military academy. In
1999–2000, the number of students in all of the new high school college
preparatory programs combined (regional magnets, IBs, and MSTAs)
totaled only 4,541, or less than 5 percent of all high school students.
Of course, there are special college preparatory programs in other high
schools, small high schools, and charter schools and advanced academic
courses available in high schools across the city, but in many general
high schools these offerings are quite limited. The regional magnet
high schools provide little additional access to challenging academic
courses of study for the majority of students. The new high schools are
so exclusive that, according to news reports, only 3 to 5 percent of
students who applied and tested for admission were admitted to the
three North Side regional magnets in 2001 (Rossi, 2001). At the same
time, there has been an expansion of minus programs, particularly
Direct Instruction. This program is tightly linked to improving test
scores, as revealed by its location in the Office of Accountability,
not the Office of Curriculum. In sum, programs created and expanded as
part of the post-1995 policy agenda have reinforced the inequitable
distribution of challenging academic programs.
Historically, magnet schools have increased class
differences in urban education systems, including Chicago (Kantor &
Brenzel, 1993). The new Regional College Prep Magnet High Schools are
no exception — they are permitted to bypass desegregation goals and
have more than 35 percent White students in a district that is 11
percent White. Moreover, since the development of the regional magnets,
the rate at which high-achieving students leave CPS has declined. If at
least part of the enrollment in the new high schools is comprised of
students who would otherwise have left CPS (see Allensworth
&Rosenkrantz, 2000), then these schools represent even less
expansion of opportunity for students who do not have the option to
leave the CPS system.
Conversely, the MSTA college-preparatory math and
science program seems to run counter to the dominant pattern of race
and class distribution of new programs. Seven of the eight MSTAs are in
high schools that are currently on probation and serve primarily
low-income African Americans and Latinos. Each MSTA is eventually
planned for 400 students, a much larger proportion of the total
enrollment than that directed to IB programs. However, at six of the
MSTAs, only 30–72 students were involved in 1999–2000 ,including
seventh- and eighth-graders. Moreover, preparation in the feeder
elementary schools is underfunded, and in public meetings and planning
sessions MSTA staff noted the lack of resources for the high-quality
professional development essential to building MSTAs.
From the standpoint of equity, the issue is not
whether some students and parents may want vocational or military
schools and some teachers may genuinely champion DI, or whether these
programs are an improvement over existing schools and programs. The
issue is whether all children, and especially those historically
excluded, are prepared for and encouraged to pursue an academically
challenging, thoughtful, college-bound program and have the support of
the school system to succeed in that program if they choose it. To
achieve this requires special efforts and additional resources to
overcome past inequities, which have resulted in the assignment of
working classs tudents and children of color to low-level vocational
programs, basic tracks, and academically and materially inferior
schools. Vocational programs and military academies are not inherently
inequitable (although we might challenge the ethics of a public
education that cultivates military values), but when working-class
children and children of color, who have always been the targets of
these programs, continue to be the target, and when these students have
few alternatives, the programs clearly reproduce, if not exacerbate,
inequality. Moreover, these inequalities take on new dimensions in the
context of Chicago’s economy.
New, highly publicized academic programs and magnet
schools across the city serve a dual purpose. They are an incentive for
professional and middle-class families to move to the city or remain in
the city, especially to areas of budding gentrification where they
provide access to a separate high-status-knowledge program. As one CPS
official said, the IBs are to “attract more [middle-class] students to
CPS. There aren’t enough academic offerings for parents — they’re all
going to private schools. That’s why this [the IBs] went out” (personal
communication, February 16, 2000). Yet the Daley administration cannot
ignore the city’s economically and racially marginalized majority.
Small, highly publicized college-preparatory programs and magnet high
schools also paint a veneer of equity on a vastly unequal system.
(According to the Catalyst [Schaeffer, 2000, p. 13] the new regional
magnets received almost half of CPS’s construction and renovation funds
between 1996 and1999.) I do not claim that all of those involved have
intended to develop programs that serve real estate development and
that legitimate inequality; nor do I believe that all programs do this.
The reality is more complex. For example, MSTAs may be a result of the
commitment by some CPS administrators to extend challenging academic
programs to historically disenfranchised students. Moreover, the city’s
racial politics compel the mayor and CPS leaders to make concessions to
African-American and Latino communities. A case in point is community
pressure for extensive modernization of the Region 6 Magnet High
School. Yet, despite concessions, in the context of a vastly unequal
school system and the drive to make Chicago a global city, the
aggregate effect of new programs and schools is to support educational
inequality and heightened economic and social dualities.
It is important to remember that plus programs and
schools, and even ETCs and military academies, are the upper tiers of
public schooling in Chicago. They are layered over neighborhood
elementary schools and general high schools with very limited advanced
course offerings, which represent the majority of the system. Most
important, although there is a good deal of dispute about Chicago’s
dropout rate, a large percentage of students do not make it through the
system at all. The Consortium on Chicago School Research calculates
that the cohort dropout rate (following students from age13 to 19) was
41.8 percent in 2000, down only slightly from 44.3 percent in1997
(Allensworth & Easton, 2001). As an example, at Juarez, a general
high school in a Mexican neighborhood, at the end of the first semester
of ninth grade, the enrollment of the class of 2002 was 547. At the end
of eleventh grade it was 303 (personal communication, Eric Gutstein,
August 15, 2001). Another group of students did not even make it beyond
eighth grade to enroll at Juarez. Including those students who have
dropped out citywide is central to grasping the magnitude of inequality
in Chicago Public Schools.
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